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Executive Summary 
The American pharmaceutical industry - one of the few 
high-tech sectors of the U.S. economy that still leads the world 
marketplace- is under unparalleled assault from its own gov-
ernment which threatens price controls and other restrictions. 
Public policymakers need to consider carefully the consequences 
of their actions before rushing headlong into the controls 
morass. This report provides some needed perspective. 
Critics of pharmaceutical companies complain that prices and 
profits are very high. They are not satisfied with the industry's 
responses: prescription medicines are a small part of health care 
costs; drug prices are now slowing down substantially; generous 
earnings are needed to invest in the expensive process of devel-
oping new drugs; medicines are often far more cost-effective than 
alternatives such as surgery. 
Key Findings and Conclusions 
This study of pharmaceutical prices reaches several major 
conclusions: 
1. As a result of the monopoly rights granted by the Food and 
Drug Administration for specified periods of time, successful 
new drugs are often very profitable. However, the odds of 
corning in with a financial blockbuster are low; most new 
drugs do not cover the company's investment in research 
and development. 
2. The extended regulatory procedures of the Food and Drug 
Administration raise the time and cost of developing new 
medicines. Government and private researchers estimate 
the total before-tax cost in the range of $231-359 million 
per successful "new chemical entity" (and in the neighbor-
hood of $194 million after taxes). 
3. Increasing domestic and foreign competition is slowing 
down price increases of prescription medicines. Patients' 
costs for the eight most widely used chemical compounds 
grew at an average annual rate of 1.6 percent from 1985 to 
1992, less than half of the rate of increase in the consumer 
price index. 
Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor 
and Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at 
Washington University in St. Louis. 
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4. Outpatient prescription drugs are less than 5 percent of U.S. 
health care expenditures. Nevertheless, the public concern 
arises primarily from the fact that medicare and other health 
insurance and benefit programs cover little or no medicine 
costs. 
5. Price controls, as urged by many critics, have an unrelieved 
history of failure in the United States. They divert resources 
from the sectors of the economy whose prices are controlled 
and result in shortages, qualitative or quantitative, on the 
part of the consuming public. 
6. Nevertheless, price controls are politically popular. Politi-
cians are applauded when they institute these controls and 
they are also lauded when they eliminate the controls after 
they become discredited. 
7. There is a better alternative to price controls in responding 
to consumer concerns about high prices - more competi-
tion. Unfortunately, federal and state laws and regulations 
limit the role of price competition for prescription medicines. 
8. These anti-consumer restrictions should be lifted. States 
should eliminate the prohibitions against advertising the 
price of prescription drugs. Such restrictions make it hard 
for consumers to shop for the best price. 
9. The FDA should reduce its barriers to advertising pre-
scription medicines. The record shows that, by promoting 
competition, advertising reduces the prices that consumers 
pay. 
The best protection for the consumer is not governmental 
price controls, but a strong and competitive private sector. 
Reforming the costly and elaborate regulation of pharmaceuti-
cals will do far more for the consumer than a new round of gov-
ernment controls. Such action would also speed up the intro-
duction of new and better medicines. 
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Introduction 
The American pharmaceutical industry is. experiencing an 
unparalleled assault. Patients are upset about the high and ris-
ing prices for the medicines that they need. Congressional 
committees and consumer groups are aroused by the high profits 
that are reported. I And the president of the United States has 
repeatedly promised to "crack down" on the pharmaceutical 
companies and seems to be advocating some form of price con-
trois. 
In turn, the industry has responded with several counter-
arguments: 
• Prescription medicines are a small portion of health-care 
costs. 
• Prescription prices in recent years have been rising no faster 
than other health-care costs and are now slowing down sub-
s tan tiall y. 
• The public concern seems to arise primarily from an artifact 
of the way that health care costs are financed: many insur-
ance and benefit programs, notably medicare, cover little or 
no medicine costs. 
• As a result, this relatively small part of the total health care 
system frequently represents a large share of the patient's 
personal cash outlay. It is estimated that prescription costs 
represent the highest out-of-pocket medical expense for 
three out of four elderly Americans.2 
These counter-arguments are not satisfying the public or their 
governmental representatives. The pressure to regulate drug 
prices is escalating. In the memorable words of one senator, "It 
is hard to believe that a company could charge so much for such 
a tiny pill. "3 Given the frequent tendency of Congress to legis-
late first and investigate afterwards, there is an urgent need to 
examine the issue of pharmaceutical prices more closely. This 
report attempts to do just that by probing below the surface of 
the current debate. 
The Nature of the Prescription 
Medicine Business 
Three key characteristics describe the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry today: 
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1. It is truly a high-tech industry, one of the very few in which 
the United States still leads the world. 
2. It is an extremely high-risk industry, but one which rewards 
generously those who succeed in developing new and better 
medicines needed by the public. 
3. It is facing a two-front threat- one in the form of growing 
pressures from foreign competition and the other from hos-
tile public policy. 
Let us examine each of these three points in detail and see 
how closely they relate to each other. 
The High-Tech Pharmaceutical Industry 
Most people think of the electronics and computer companies 
when they talk about high-tech. Some add the aerospace indus-
try. Of course, all three are key elements of this country's ad-
vanced technological base. However, by any objective measure, 
the pharmaceutical companies merit inclusion in that category. 
According to the National Science Foundation, in 1990 the 
average manufacturing company devoted an amount equal to 3 
percent of its sales to research and development (the R&D/sales 
ratio is a standard measure of the technological intensity of an 
industry or firm). Several major industries did far better than 
that. Electronics reported a 5.5 percent ratio and computers an 
8 percent ratio. However, this is dwarfed by the 16 percent ex-
perienced by the members of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association. 
Moreover, the major pharmaceutical companies report a 
steady and rapid increase in their funding of R&D. As shown in 
Figure 1, their outlays for R&D rose from $2 billion in 1980 to 
$10.9 billion in 1992, a more than five-fold increase.4 Because of 
the special nature of the product, the R&D is uniquely intensive. 
The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment has identified twelve 
different phases of the pharmaceutical R&D process as described 
on page 6. 
Of course, expenditures on R&D are at best an input. What is 
desired is the output in the form of a greater flow of new and bet-
ter medicines. The public has not been disappointed on that 
score. While many Americans bemoan the inroads that foreign 
companies are making in our domestic markets, the United 
States can properly boast of a world class pharmaceutical indus-
try, one which is clearly the international leader. An analysis of 
97 new drugs introduced in world markets between 1975 and 
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Figure 1 
Pharmaceutical Industry R&D 
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Source: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. 
1989 reported that the United States was the source of 47 - al-
most one-half.5 An analysis of 196 "consensus new drugs" 
(those sold in a majority of major markets worldwide) reported a 
similar conclusion for the period 1970-85. During that longer 
period, the pharmaceutical companies of the United States ac-
counted for 85, or 43 percent, of the total.6 
It is also instructive to examine the March 9, 1992 issue of 
Fortune magazine which contains a scorecard on international 
competitiveness. Fortune gives the pharmaceutical industry one 
of only two As. In comparison, electronics received a dismal D. 
A somewhat similar result was reported by the General Account-
ing Office (GAO). In a November 1992 report, the GAO stated 
that, with one exception, all eleven high-technology industries 
"exhibited some decline in the U.S. leadership position over the 
1980s." The exception was the pharmaceutical industry.7 
While so many other industries complain about rising import 
penetration of our domestic markets, the U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies generate a substantial excess of exports over imports, 
year after year- with Japan, as well as with many other nations 
(see Figure 2). 
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The Pharmaceutical R&D Process 
1. Synthesis and extraction - identifying new molecules with the 
potential to produce a desired change in the biological system 
(e.g., to inhibit or stimulate an important enzyme, to alter a 
metabolic pathway, or to change cellular structures). 
2. Biological screening and pharmacological testing- exploring 
the pharmacological activity and therapeutic potential of com-
pounds. 
3. Pharmaceutical dosage formulation and stability testing -
turning an active compound into a form and strength suitable 
for human use. 
4. Toxicology and safety testing- determining the potential risk 
a compound poses to humans and to the environment. 
5. Application for review - to give the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) the opportunity to prevent testing of the 
compound on humans. 
6. Phase I evaluation- the first testing of a new compound on 
human subjects in order to establish tolerance, absorption 
rates, etc. 
7. Phase II evaluation - controlled clinical trials on a relatively 
small number of patients. 
8. Phase III evaluation- clinical trials of a drug's safety and ef-
fectiveness in hospitals and outpatient settings. 
9. Process developmentfor manufacturing and quality control-
establishing a company's capacity to produce a product in large 
volume and at high quality. 
10. Bioavailability studies- using healthy volunteers to document 
the rate of absorption and excretion from the body of a com-
pound's active ingredients. 
11. New drug application - applying to the FDA for approval to 
market a new drug, providing all the information gathered dur-
ing the drug discovery and development process. 
12. Post-approval research - undertaking experimental studies 
and surveillance activities after a drug is approved for mar-
keting.a 
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Figure 2 
Pharmaceutical Trade Balance 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. 
The High Risks Faced by the Industry 
There is no doubt about it. Successful new drugs are often 
very profitable. The Food and Drug Administration does grant 
monopoly rights, albeit for limited periods of time for any one 
medicine. But the other side of the coin is that the odds of com-
ing in with a financial blockbuster are low. A study at Duke 
University of 100 drugs revealed that a majority did not even 
cover the company's investment in R&D.9 
Why are the odds of attaining real profitability so low? For 
insight into that question, we must examine in more detail the 
nature of the extended processes by which new pharmaceuticals 
are developed by the companies and approved by the FDA. First 
of all, thousands of promising new chemical compounds are sub-
jected to intensive laboratory and animal testing before being 
tested in clinical studies in humans. On average, 5000 different 
compounds must be tested in order to come up with one new 
drug approved by the FDA. Usually, 50 compounds are tested 
on animals before one is tested on humans and only one out of 
five of those gains FDA approval (see Figure 3). In plain English, 
that means that most proposed medicines don't make the grade. 
Even when they do, they take a long time to pay off. 
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Figure 3 
The Pipeline of New Medicines 
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Delays. The FDA has been repeatedly criticized for delays in 
ap~roving new drugs.lO It takes the FDA typically 2-1/2 years to 
review a proposed new pharmaceutical product. However, that 
is only a fraction of the total time involved from the viewpoint of 
a pharmaceutical firm. A study at Tufts University reported that 
it takes an average of 12 years to get from initial research 
through final review for approval of a new medicine.ll (See 
Figure 4 for the steps in the procedure.) Nobody wants unsafe 
pharmaceuticals on the market, but the tendency of the regula-
tors has been to be so cautious as to delay the approval of new 
and better medicines. 
A study of new drugs that were introduced in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom in the period 1977 to 1987 
reported that far more - 114 - were first available in Great 
Britain, compared to only 41 that were first available in the 
United States. The average delay time behind the British ranged 
from five years for respiratory medicines to three years for 
cardiovascular medicines to one year for endocrine medicines.l2 
We sho~ld acknowledge, however, that the British put more 
emphasis on costly post-marketing surveillance than does the 
regulatory regime of the United States. 
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Figure 4 
The Steps Toward Drug Approval 
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Source: Joseph DiMasi, "The Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry" Journal of Health Economics. 
These delays, however, are not surprising, given the cardinal 
rule for bureaucratic survival: Do not stick your neck out. If you 
were an FDA reviewer and you were to approve a new prescrip-
tion medicine, you would be taking a substantial career risk. If 
anybody should suffer any severe adverse reaction, you would be 
exposed to tremendous public criticism. On the other hand, if 
you do not approve the drug, the potential users are unlikely to 
complain, since they do not know about it and they will soon 
pass from the scene. With the recent exception of drugs for 
AIDS patients, little congressional attention has been devoted to 
the failure to approve a new medicine. 
As a result, the FDA reviewers faced with a difficult decision 
often ask for more studies, and delay the introduction of new 
pharmaceuticals. Consider the results bluntly: if 16 people are 
harmed by side-effects of a drug in use, that becomes front-page 
news. If 10,000 people die prematurely because approval of a 
new drug has been delayed, the public is unaware. By the way, 
that figure of 10,000 is not plucked out of the air. It was the es-
timate of how many people died needlessly each year during the 
period 1967-1976 when the FDA was slow in approving beta 
blockers for reducing the risk of heart attack. The United King-
dom had given the go ahead earlier.l3 
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In 1992, Congress did enact a law designed to speed up the 
FDA approval process with funds from a new set of user fees. 
Although the Prescription Drug User Fee Act is now in force, the 
Clinton Administration has indicated that it intends to use the 
revenues to reduce the overall budget deficit. 
The average cost of developing a new drug 
rose to $231 million in 1990. 
Expense. The entire drug review sequence is not only very 
time consuming, it is also very expensive. As would be ex-
pected, specific estimates of cost vary considerably. Studies at 
the University of Rochester, Texas A & M, and Tufts University 
show that the average cost of developing a new drug rose from 
$54 million in the 1970s to $125 million in the 1980s, and to 
$231 million in 1990.14 (See Figure 5.) 
An early 1993 study by Congress' Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) reports that "a reasonable upper bound" on 
the fully capitalized cost of R&D per successful NCE ("new chem-
ical entity," the technical term for a pharmaceutical) at the time 
of market approval is $359 million. This figure is comparable to 
the earlier private studies, but that is not the way that the OTA 
study has been reported.15 The newspaper accounts have in-
stead compared the OTA's estimated after-tax cost per NCE of 
$194 million with earlier studies of pre-tax costs.16 That biased 
comparison leads the reader to the erroneous conclusion that the 
private figures are too high. As the OT A report warned, because 
of the rapid changes in science and technology, it is impossible 
to predict the cost of bringing a new drug to market today from 
estimated costs for drugs whose development began more than a 
decade ago.17 
Of course, any of these estimates - $194 million, $231 mil-
lion, or $359 million - represents a very substantial commit-
ment of corporate funds. The basic incentive to make these 
large investments is the possibility of achieving high profits. As 
economist Sam Peltzman has pointed out: "Drug companies un-
dertake these massive searches knowing there will be a big pay-
off if they hit a winner. We can have lower drug prices if we ac-
cept less of that searching [for new chemical compounds]. 
That's the choice we face." 18 The OTA study concluded that the 
profits of drug companies are higher by 2 to 3 percentage points 
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Figure 5 
Rising Cost of Drug Development 
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Sources: R. Hansen, University of Rochester; S. N. Wiggins, Texas 
A&M University; J. A. DiMasi, Tufts University. 
a year than other high-technology, high-risk industries that are 
dependent on scientific research. 
The Two-Front Threat 
The expansion of overseas economies as other nations also 
achieve advanced industrialization constitutes a two-edged 
sword for the American pharmaceutical industry. On the one 
hand, that development means additional markets for the prod-
ucts of the U.S. industry. As we have seen, exports of American-
made medicines constitute a positive factor in this nation's bal-
ance of trade and, hence, balance of payments. 
However, on the other hand, the increased sophistication of 
industries in other nations enables them to compete more effec-
tively with their American counterparts. As we can also recall 
from Figure 2, the U.S. pharmaceutical trade surplus in the last 
few years has not exceeded the 1990 level. Moreover, while the 
U.S. industry still maintains a lead in the introduction of new 
medicines, other nations are reducing that gap. Japan and 
Westem Europe all have strong and active pharmaceutical firms. 
Of the top 36 NCEs approved and marketed in the United States 
in the 1980s, U.S.-based companies received a significantly 
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smaller market share than they did for the NCEs approved in the 
1970s (62 percent versus 82 percent). During the same period, 
foreign-based companies more than doubled their share of NCEs 
in this critical portion of the U.S. market (from 18 percent to 38 
percent).l9 
Overseas locations also exercise an attractive force on Ameri-
can companies that are considering the optimum location of new 
facilities in the increasingly global economy. This issue is be-
coming especially relevant in view of the possible withdrawal of 
tax benefits for manufacturing investments in Puerto Rico as 
discussed below. 
The major threat to American pharmaceutical 
firms arises from its own government. 
Thus, the major threat to American pharmaceutical firms 
arises from its own government. Repeated statements by the 
president of the United States that he intends to "crack down" on 
the domestic industry are not to be taken lightly. Top Clinton 
adviser James Carville was recently quoted by the Wall Street 
Journal as saying, "We'll be trying to change the health-care 
system. Those who get in your way, you try to run over by say-
ing they are putting their self-interest against the national inter-
est. "20 That approach surely loads the deck against private en-
terprise in any public policy debate. 
At this point formal price controls have not been proposed by 
the Clinton Administration, but early moves in that direction are 
already visible. For example, the tax system has attracted 
attention as a way of enforcing government "guidelines" on 
increases in the price of medicines. Specifically, the White 
House and its congressional supporters have focused consider-
able attention on Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code, the 
provision that exempts from federal taxation the income that is 
earned through manufacturing operations in Puerto Rico and 
other U.S. territories. Although the tax benefit is available to 
American businesses generally, drug companies have been 
among the major beneficiaries of Section 936, as has the econ-
omy of Puerto Rico. Much of the profits (about $15 billion) has 
been deposited in Puerto Rico banks. One British observer, 
Canute James of the Financial Times, describes these deposits 
as "a pillar of the island's financial stability." He reports that the 
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tax incentives are seen as the main fuel for the rapid expansion 
of the Puerto Rico economy. 21 
U.S. legislators have proposed several key changes to Section 
936. Some would limit it to firms that raise their prices no faster 
than the consumer price index -which amounts to a form of 
price control. One senator has suggested replacing Section 936 
with a partial credit for wages paid. 
Meanwhile, the House of Representatives has been holding 
hearings on legislation increasing the enforcement authority of 
the Food and Drug Administration. The proposed Food, Drug, 
Cosmetic and Device Safety Amendments would give the FDA 
very broad and vaguely defined powers. For example, the FDA 
could issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of any witness 
and the production of any document that relates to any matters 
within that federal agency's vast jurisdiction.22 
This would, of course, be in addition to the agency's substan-
tial existing enforcement power, which includes inspecting 
pharmaceutical factories without warrant, seizing batches of a 
product if the batch is adulterated or mislabeled, and carrying 
out multiple seizures, effectively eliminating a product from the 
market. The danger in giving bureaucratic officials sweeping 
powers was underscored, perhaps inadvertently, in a recent 
statement by the head of FDA's Drug Surveillance Branch: 
We used to say that if a company made certain 
changes, then we would probably not take any action. 
Now, we won't. Now, even if they make the changes, 
they might end up in court. We want to say to these 
companies that you don't know when or how we'll 
strike. We want to eliminate predictability.23 
To a substantial extent, the FDA itself is the victim of the 
tendency of the Congress to enact many new laws with statutory 
deadlines which are impractical to meet. For example, the pres-
tigious Advisory Committee on the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, in its final report in May 1991, concluded that it "will prob-
ably be impossible to meet" the deadlines set in the Safe Medical 
Devices Act. It reached a similar conclusion on the Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act, stating that "the law sets out objec-
tives that cannot be achieved within the statutory timetable." 
The Committee added, presciently, "The whirlwind of new leg-
islative demands will not soon abate. "24 
It is intriguing to note that the timing of governmental deci-
sionmakers may be less than optimum. These legislative de-
mands were less intense during the 1980s when the U.S. phar-
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maceutical industry was one of the few sectors of manufacturing 
to report increases in employment. Currently, the rising interest 
in restrictive legislation coincides with the announcement of re-
structuring and layoffs by several large pharmaceutical compa-
nies. 
Moreover, some Washington cynics maintain that congres-
sional action on controversial issues usually occurs after the in-
tensity of the problem has abated. This surely has been the case 
in much legislation designed to cure temporarily high unem-
ployment. 
In the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, payer pressure -plus 
increasing domestic and foreign competition - is curbing price 
rises. Recent data on retail prescription prices show that pa-
tients' costs for the eight most widely used chemical compounds 
grew at an average annual rate of 1.6 percent from 1985 to 1992, 
less than half of the rate of increase in the consumer price index. 
According to medical industry consultants L. John Wilkerson 
and Robert Easton, because of increased innovation and compe-
tition, the exclusivity periods in which companies enjoy price 
protection for new high-value medicines have dropped from ten 
years in the 1960s to three to four years in the early 1990s.25 
According to economist Burton Weisbrod, only 25 percent of 
the 200 largest-selling drugs remain in that group 15 years later 
and about 10 percent of the 200 are new each year.26 As the 
patents of these brand-name drugs expire, generic versions be-
come available and begin to erode the market share of the exist-
ing brand-name pharmaceuticals. This is particularly true since 
the passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restora-
tion Act of 1984, which facilitated the entry of generic producers 
after patent expiration.27 
The Consumer Interest in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
Consumers have a very ambivalent attitude toward the com-
panies that make pharmaceutical products. On the one hand, 
patients appreciate the ability of these firms to develop new and 
better medicines. But, on the other hand, they resent what they 
see as greedy corporations taking advantage of the situation to 
raise prices inordinately and to make excessive profits. This lat-
ter attitude is encouraged by governmental attacks on the indus-
try's pricing practices. 
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A recent report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) pro-
vided added fuel to the fire. The GAO reported that, because of 
government price controls in Canada, the prices of many 
medicines are substantially lower there than in the United States 
- on average, about 25 percent at wholesale.28 As in so many 
issues of public policy, the facts of the matter are too compli-
cated to fit on the proverbial bumper sticker. The Pharmaceuti-
cal Manufacturers Association countered by noting that dis-
counts and rebates by U.S. manufacturers were ignored in the 
study. Ernst Berndt of MIT called the GAO study procedures not 
meeting "basic professional standards of integrity and reliabil-
ity. "29 
New and Better Medicines 
There is little, if any, argument that the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry produces a constant flow of new and improved prod-
ucts. In striking contrast, virtually no innovative pharmaceuti-
cal products have been developed in Canada since the advent of 
stringent price controls in that nation in 1969. Lacy Glenn 
Thomas of Emory University has shown that countries like 
France and Austria, which have the toughest price restrictions 
on pharmaceuticals, also do the least research.30 
Moreover, many of the innovative medicines developed in this 
country- while very expensive - enable the patient to avoid 
painful and even more costly surgery. For example, the cost of 
treating ulcers with H-2 antagonist drug therapy runs about 
$900 a year, a very considerable sum of money for the typical 
patient. But, according to data from the U.S. Health Care 
Financing Administration, the cost of ulcer surgery, in contrast, 
averages $28,900.31 (See Figure 6.) 
It is useful to consider the somewhat analogous case of treat-
ing drinking water with fluoride in order to reduce dental bills. 
Consumers rarely if ever complain about the expense of this 
cost-effective alternative to medical treatment because the cost is 
buried in their tax bills or water bills. In any event, let us turn to 
the subject of high prices for medicines. 
High and Rising Medicine Prices 
On the surface, the facts are clear: the prices of many phar-
maceutical products are high and rising. In the aggregate, out-
lays for pharmaceuticals in the United States rose from $20 bil-
lion in 1985 to $32 billion in 1990. Back in 1985, the expense 
for medicines came to 4.8 percent of total medical expenditures. 
According to the Health Care Financing Administration (a part of 
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the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), despite the 
large absolute rise since then, pharmaceuticals accounted for the 
same 4.8 cents of the average health care dollar in 1990-1992. 
That is, costs of prescription medicine have risen at about the 
same rate as other health-care costs. However, we should note 
that overall health-care cost increases have clearly outpaced the 
general inflation rate in recent years. 
Thus, there are several ways of presenting the facts, some fa-
vorable to the industry and others unfavorable. For example, it 
is common to ignore the close relationship between medical and 
pharmaceutical costs and merely state that the prices of 
medicines have gone up faster than the consumer price index -
at least until very recently. Such a statement may be technically 
true (this point is covered a little later), but it is far from the 
whole story. In contrast, reporting that the prices charged for 
medicine have been going up at the same rate as hospital and 
doctor bills - and no faster- is also accurate, but provides a 
very different perspective. 
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Looking at the price record prior to 1980 is also revealing. 
Between 1966 and 1982, outpatient drugs were a steadily declin-
ing share of U.S. health care expenditures- from a high point of 
8.8 percent in 1966 to a low of 4. 7 percent in 1982 (see Figure 7). 
We can only speculate as to why the improvement in the relative 
cost of drugs stabilized in the early 1980s and has not declined 
further since. Perhaps the rapid rise in the cost of developing 
new drugs since then has played a part in that change. Surely, 
we would expect that scientists first discover and companies 
market the medicines that are easier and hence less costly to de-
velop. Over time, the more difficult and expensive medical ap-
plications are developed. 
Costs of prescription medicine have risen at 
about the same rate as other health-care costs. 
Pharmaceutical researchers have attributed much of the rise 
in the cost of developing new medicines to the use of more pa-
tients in clinical trials, increasingly complex testing, and grow-
ing interest in developing treatments for chronic and degenera-
tive diseases like cancer and Alzheimer's.32 
We must also be aware of the fact that knowledgeable re-
searchers question very seriously the validity of the numbers on 
pharmaceutical prices issued by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS).33 The point here is well known to economists 
and statisticians but usually ignored in discussions of public pol-
icy. That is, the official price indices do not take into account 
the fact that the quality of the products that consumers buy of-
ten changes over time. To the extent that is the case, some por-
tion of the reported increase in drug prices is due to the fact that 
Americans are buying newer and better, albeit more costly, pre-
scription medicines. 
In the case of automobiles, in contrast, BLS takes into ac-
count the extent to which new cars are safer and pollute less. If 
the price of an otherwise similar car rises only by the cost of new 
safety and anti-pollution equipment, BLS would not report that 
the price of automobiles is going up. The agency deducts the 
safety and environmental costs on the assumption that the new 
model car is different - and better in that regard - than the 
previous model. 
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The advances in new prescription· medicine are often dra-
matic, yet BLS does not treat them in a similar way. In a 1992 
study performed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
an effort was made to do just that in the case of medicine used to 
control high blood pressure. The MIT researchers found that, for 
the six-year period January 1986 to December 1991, more than 
one-half of the reported price increases (53.6 percent) was ac-
counted for by quality improvement.34 A comparable study of 
anti-ulcer drugs at the University of Michigan came up with simi-
lar conclusions.35 
In a far more substantive response to the concern over high 
prices for drugs in August 1992, pharmaceutical companies set 
up a toll-free BOO-number so that physicians could call to get free 
pharmaceuticals for indigent patients. Approximately 2,500 
calls are currently received each month.36 
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Two Responses: Price Controls or Competition 
Many people's instinctive response to high or rising prices is 
to call for government price controls. In fact, in an effort tore-
duce public concern and to head off formal controls, some of the 
major pharmaceutical firms have promised to keep their price 
increases within the overall rate of inflation. Some disagreement 
has occurred about the extent to which the companies have 
achieved the price target.37 
Perhaps the more binding approach is the growing likelihood 
that Medicare coverage will be expanded to include pharmaceu-
tical products. In such event, some limited form of price regula-
tion on prescriptions paid by Medicare would be quite likely. 
Medicare coverage will likely be expanded to 
include pharmaceutical products. 
Reimbursing medicare patients for drug purchases could be-
come a two-edged sword. Initially, such a change would ease the 
financial burden on the elderly- and thus reduce the political 
pressures on health-care policymakers. But these reimburse-
ments could also become the vehicle for giving the federal gov-
ernment more opportunity to control drug prices. 
Experience With Price Controls. Of course, the United States 
has a great deal of experience with controlling prices. These 
episodes have ranged from general price controls during World 
War II, the Korean War, and the 1971-73 period, to controls on 
rent by many municipalities which continue to this day. The 
experience is uniformly adverse. Investors shift their funds to 
sectors of the American economy without price controls. The de-
teriorating housing stock in New York City is a constant re-
minder of the failure of selective price controls. Moreover, in the 
case of more mobile resources than land and buildings, investors 
increasingly have attractive alternatives overseas. 
But, most important, consumers suffer from the shortages 
that result. These shortages may be quantitative, as occurred in 
many markets during 1971-73 or qualitative, as Canada is expe-
riencing right now. In the case of Canada, the ready availability 
of new medicines developed in the United States has alleviated 
the problem of lack of innovation by the Canadian pharmaceuti-
cal industry. 
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Evaluations of the 1971-73 experience with price controls are 
uniformly negative. A "temporary" 90-day freeze was quickly 
transformed into formal controls that lasted for nearly three 
years. Evasions and distortions became widespread. Because 
foreign trade was exempt, rapid increases in exports produced 
spot shortages. Some of these items were imported back into the 
United States merely to avoid the price controls. Product quality 
deteriorated as producers attempted to maintain profit margins 
in the face of the government's price ceilings ("caps" is the cur-
rent euphemism).38 
According to Dr. Marvin Kosters, a senior official in the Nixon 
Administration during the 1971-73 wage and price controls, "It 
would be a mistake to underestimate the ingenuity of people in 
the private sector to take advantage of discrepancies in a system 
of price controls." A similar conclusion was reached by Dr. Barry 
Bosworth, a senior official in the Carter Administration's efforts 
to enforce voluntary wage and price guidelines, who noted: " ... 
you just never would have believed so many things could go 
wrong."39 
These are not isolated judgments. A recent Washington Post 
roundup of expert opinion on price controls in health-care re-
ported variations on the same negative theme: 
The reaction of price controls now, as in the past, is 
likely to be evasion, inflation, and confusion, experts 
say. The resulting distortions could include everything 
from unnecessary surgery to longer waiting lines, from 
poorer quality care to strikes over the wages of nurses, 
technicians, and other health care workers.40 
The Alternative of Competition. There is an alternative to 
price controls in responding to consumer and public concerns 
over pharmaceuticals. That alternative is more competition. 
Again, some careful consideration is necessary. Simply 
eliminating the patent protection enjoyed by developers of new 
medicines would not work. The absence of patent protection 
would take away the incentive to undertake the large 
investments necessary to develop new pharmaceutical products. 
The basic alternative to price controls is to broaden the role of 
price competition. At the present time, many states prohibit ad-
vertising the price of prescription drugs. Such restrictions make 
it difficult for consumers to shop for the best price.41 Every state 
legislature which has enacted such anti-consumer legislation 
should promptly repeal it. Even industry critic Senator David 
Pryor has urged that the market for medicine be made more 
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price-sensitive. He specifically states, "Any reform effort should 
make sure that both doctors and patients are more aware of 
prices. "42 
At the federal level, the Food and Drug Administration should 
reduce the barriers it has set up which inhibit advertising pre-
scription medicines. 43 Because consumers must obtain a pre-
scription from a physician in order to acquire prescription drugs, 
there is less reason to fear deception in advertising in this mar-
ket than in any other. On the positive side, experience shows 
that direct advertising can reduce the prices that consumers 
pay.44 Such evidence was cited by the Supreme Court in the de-
cision overturning state bans on advertising of eyeglasses. 
The current FDA rules on advertising appear to be needlessly 
bureaucratic. Specifically, the agency should reconsider the re-
quirement for the misnamed "brief summary" which must ac-
company any ad that both mentions a health condition and indi-
cates the name of a drug which can be used for the condition. 
The notorious "brief summary" is actually a lengthy statement 
in small print listing side effects and contraindications associ-
ated with a prescription drug. Of course, such information is es-
sential for physicians, for whom the brief summaries were origi-
nally designed, but the technical language borders on the in-
comprehensible for the average patient. 
The FDA regulations also discourage prescription drug ads 
from being shown on television, a major source of information 
for many consumers. The high cost of ads in the print media-
resulting from the FDA requirements- also reduces their use. 
Like so much government regulation, the result is just the oppo-
site of what the FDA wants to achieve. Due to the restraint on 
advertising, consumers may not be aware that a treatment exists 
for a certain condition and so they will not consult a physician. 
In other circumstances, consumers may suffer some symptoms 
(e.g., thirst) without realizing that these are symptoms of a treat-
able disease (e.g., diabetes). Alternatively, a new remedy with 
reduced side effects may become available, but patients are not 
aware of it and do not visit their physicians to obtain a prescrip-
tion. 
As has been demonstrated in many other areas of the econ-
omy, the best protection for the consumer is not governmental 
price controls, but a strong and competitive private sector. Re-
forming the costly and elaborate drug regulation process will do 
more for the consumer than a new round of government con-
trols. Simultaneously, such action would speed up the introduc-
tion of new and better medicines. Increasing the scope for com-
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panies to compete for the consumer's dollars is demonstrably the 
best way for government to "protect" the public. 
Conclusion 
There are a few basic lessons that public policy makers need 
to learn. 
First of all, deal with a broad issue such as health care in a 
comprehensive manner. Do not look at doctor bills or hospital 
bills or medicine costs in isolation. Otherwise, there is great 
danger of squeezing (or "cracking down on," to use the prevail-
ing political term) the most cost-effective part of health care. 
The best protection for the consumer is not 
governmental price controls, but a strong 
and competitive private sector. 
Secondly, realize that regulation is a powerful medicine. 
Government regulation is not as costless as it may seem. It gen-
erates lots of costs as well as benefits. Some of the most impor-
tant costs may be hidden, in the form of unexpected and un-
wanted side-effects, such as reduced innovation of new and 
better products and processes. 
Third, price controls are an act of frustration. Sadly, they 
are doubly popular. Politicians are applauded when they insti-
tute these controls and once again when they eliminate the con-
trols after they become discredited. 
Fourth, expand the role of competition. Warts and all, the 
competitive marketplace is the most effective protector of the 
consumer. 
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